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ABSTRACT
Using   the   Panel   Study   of   Income   Dynamics,   we   find   th at true wage changes have many fewer
nominal   cuts   and   more   nominal   freezes   than   reported   nominal wage changes.  The data overwhelmingly
rejects   a   model   of   flexible   wage   changes   and   provides   some   evidence   against   a   model   of   perfect   downward
rigidity   in   favor   of   a   more   general   model.   The more general model incorporates downward rigidity but
specifies that nominal wage cuts may occur when large cuts would occur in the absence   of wage rigidity.
However,   the   results   of   the   general   model   imply   that   nominal   wage   cuts are rare.    We  also   analyze   the
personnel files of a large corporation and find cuts   in   base   pay   are   rare   and   almost   always associated with
changes   in   full   time status or a switch between compensation schemes involving incentives.  Our   evidence
on   the   consequences   of   nominal wage rigidity is mixed.  We find modest support for the   hypothesis   that
workers who are overpaid because of nominal wage rigidity are less likely to quit.
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In this paper, we address two questions: First, to what extent are nominal wages downwardly
rigid?  Second, how big an effect do such rigidities have on wage levels, wage changes, and quits,
layoffs, and promotions?  The answers to these questions are important because macroeconomists in the
Keynesian tradition have long argued that nominal rigidities play a key role in the dynamics of wages
and unemployment.  The answers are crucial to understanding the effects of inflation on labor markets
and to determining the costs and benefits of positive inflation.
While there is a large aggregate time series literature on the interaction between wage, price, and
employment dynamics, research based on data on individual wage rates is much more limited.  The
recent literature on nominal wage rigidity begins with a study by McLaughlin (1994),  who provides
references to a few earlier studies.  McLaughlin concludes wages are generally flexible. He finds that
17% of annual wage changes involve nominal wage cuts and argues that, even after accounting for
measurement error, at least 12% of wage changes involve nominal wage cuts.  Kahn (1997) shows that
the probability of a nominal wage change falling into any range with end points defined as “the median
pay change minus r percentage points” and “the median pay change minus r+1 percentage points”
depends negatively on an indicator variable for whether a pay change in that range involves a nominal
wage cut. Card and  Hyslop (1997) assume for identification that the wage change distribution is
symmetric around the median wage change, and that the upper half of the distribution is unaffected by
nominal rigidities. They then calculate a counterfactual bottom half of the  wage change distribution that
would hold in the absence of wage rigidity. They find that downward rigidity exists but has little effect
on real wage growth. The methodologies of both Kahn and Card and  Hyslop implicitly assume that there
is no measurement error in wage reports although they both discuss likely effects of measurement error
on their results.
1 However ,  McLaughlin (1999) provides some evidence against the assumption that
wage changes are symmetric in the upper half of the distribution, suggesting Card and  Hsylop's methods
may overstate nominal rigidity.  Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) investigate the importance of
measurement error by taking a small wage sample in which there are very few nominal wage cuts and
                                                
1 Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics  Lebow, Stockton, and  Wascher (1995) also find evidence of a spike in the
nominal wage change distribution at zero and interpret asymmetries in the wage change distribution as at least partially
due to nominal rigidity.  Blinder and Choi (1990) and  Bewley  (1997) provide evidence based on employer surveys that
nominal wage cuts are uncommon as well as some evidence about why firms are reluctant to cut wages. We should
emphasize at the outset that we have nothing new to say about the longstanding but still unresolved theoretical issue of
why there would be downward nominal wage.2
dirtying the data. They find that the  mismeasured data contains a similar percentage of nominal wage
cuts to that in the PSID.
2  Shea (1997) matches a sample of unionized workers in the PSID to provisions
of particular long-term contracts. While only 1.3% of the sample have true nominal wage cuts, 21%
report nominal wage cuts. These results imply that measurement error could account for almost all
nominal wage cuts reported in survey data.  Groshen and  Schweitzer (1999) use inflation-induced inter-
occupational wage changes to identify the effects of downward nominal rigidity.
Overall, the research since McLaughlin’s important study suggests that nominal wage cuts are
less common in the U.S. than he found. 
3 However, it does not provide us with a precise estimate of how
common nominal wage cuts are, or much information on when they occur.   The main source of the
difficulty is measurement error in wage reports, which makes it very difficult to identify when nominal
wage cuts have occurred.
We add to the literature on the extent of nominal wage rigidity in two ways.  First, we use the
presumably error free wage data from the personnel files of a large financial corporation to check how
many workers receive wage cuts.  We find that only about 0.5 percent of salaried worker s  receive
nominal wage reductions. Only 2.5 percent of hourly workers receive wage reductions.  Furthermore,
almost all of these reductions are associated with changes in part time/ full time status or switches to
compensation schemes involving performance incentives. On the other hand, we do find that reductions
in annual bonuses are quite common among salaried workers.
Unfortunately, the wage policies of the firm we study may not be representative of the labor
market at large, which is the disadvantage of the personnel file relative to noisy data from household
surveys.  Our second approach builds on earlier research using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics but
uses an econometric model that allows for a more general treatment of the wage setting process and of
measurement error. In contrast to McLaughlin (1994), who adds normally distributed measurement error
to a flexible wage model, our econometric model nests a flexible wage model, a downwardly rigid
model, and a model that allows for nominal cuts in certain circumstances, and so allows us to test
                                                
2 They also provide a good summary of recent research on nominal wage rigidity.
3 We do not know of much micro data based research for other countries on the issue of nominal wage cuts. However ,
a recent paper by Smith (1999) analyzes data from the British Household Panel and concludes that wage cuts are
common in Britain. This data set contains an indicator for whether the respondents checked their pay slips when
reporting pay level. Smith concludes that nominal wage cuts are common on the basis of the fact that 18% of persons
who report pay based on pay stubs report nominal cuts. She assumes that pay stub based reports are accurate. A
disadvantage is that the pay measure is total weekly pay rather than base hourly wage rate.  Smith addresses and largely
rejects the possibility that  hours changes, overtime and bonuses may lead to an overstatement of wage cuts but we are
not fully persuaded by this evidence, particularly with respect to hours changes.3
between them. We use worker characteristics, the price level, and the state unemployment rate to gain
information on what wage changes should be in the absence of nominal wage rigidity. For example,
young people have faster real wage growth, which means that a nominal wage floor is less likely to be
binding for them. We use estimates from the model to determine the proportion of workers who
experience wage cuts and wage freezes and to measure the effects of downward rigidity on wage levels
and wage changes. Our treatment of measurement error allows for the possibility that some individuals
correctly report their wage rates, which is a zero probability event in a model with normal measurement
error.
There is little micro data research addressing our second question---do downward nominal
rigidities affect the structure of wages and labor market outcomes such as layoffs, quits, and
promotions?
4  We address this question by examining the relationship between these variables and
estimates from our wage model of the extent to which the wage of a particular worker is affected by
nominal wage rigidity. We also analyze whether nominal wage rigidity in an environment of low
inflation might compress the wage distribution. We do this by examining whether the gap in wage
growth between workers who are predicted to have fast wage growth and workers who are predicted to
have slow wage growth depends on the inflation rate.
Our strongest finding is that nominal wages show substantial downward nominal rigidity in the
U.S. economy. We find some support for the hypothesis that workers are less likely to quit when  they
are protected by nominal wage floors. Our estimates of the effect of nominal wage rigidity on layoffs
and promotions and estimates of the effects of inflation on relative wage growth rates are too imprecise
for us to draw any conclusions.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In se ction II, we examine the frequency of nominal wage
cuts in a large financial corporation.  In Section III we describe our model of nominal wage changes and
discuss how we estimate it. In section IV, we describe the data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics that we use in this paper. In section V, we present the results of the model and the
implications of the model for wage cuts, wage freezes, wage levels, and wage changes. In section VI, we
test whether downward rigidity affects the probability of quits, layoffs, and promotions, and we look at
the effects of nominal rigidities on the wage structure. Section VII concludes.
                                                
4  Ackerlof et al (1996)  use a simulation model of the economy to analyze the costs of nominal wage rigidity and
conclude that they are substantial.4
II. Nominal Wage  Cuts in a Large Corporation
If the respondents in household surveys reported wages without error, measuring the in cidence of
annual wage cuts would be straightforward.   Unfortunately, wages are imperfectly measured in such
surveys.  For this reason, we make use of the personnel records from a large U.S. financial corporation
to take a preliminary look at the issue.
Figure 1a presents the frequency of the change in log of annual salary from May 1996 to May
1997 for 32,138 salaried workers who were active at both points in time.   As one can see, almost no
workers (.47 percent) received a wage cut.  11.36 percent had no salary change, 2.49 percent had an
increase between 0 and .02, 47.8 percent had an increase between .02 and .05, 21.91 percent had an
increase between .1 and .2, and 3.65 percent had an increase greater than .2.  A portion of the persons
with a 0 change in salary may not have had a salary review take effect during the year.
5  However, the
results show that nominal salary cuts are rare in this firm.
Figure 1b presents the frequency of the change in the hourly wage for the corresponding sample
of 1723 persons who were paid by the hour in both years.  A total of 2.5 percent of these workers
experienced cuts. Interestingly, about 7/8
th  of these are accounted for by changes between - .2 and -.5,
while only 1/8 (5 workers) received cuts between 0 and -.1.
We have  cross tabulated the changes in salary and in hourly wage rates with a file containing
information about the reason for the change in compensation.   The results show that almost all of the
reductions are associated with changes between full and part time status, or with changes in whether
performance incentives are part of compensation.
Some workers in the firm receive bonuses, and it is natural to ask whether they may provide a
way for the firm to circumvent nominal wage rigidity. Four percent of salaried workers experienced a
nominal decline in the sum of bonus plus annual salary, with declines in bonuses accounting for most of
this.  Among 7494 individuals who received a bonus in both years, 8.69% experienced a nominal
decline.  The very term “bonus” implies that compensation is transitory, and so it is perhaps not
                                                
5  At Northwestern University, salary reviews of both exempt and non-exempt staff members are conducted in June.
They become effective September 1
st .  In many cases  a  person who starts work on July 1 would not receive a salary
change until September 1 of the following year.   However, our estimate of the incidence of zero wage changes was not
sensitive to restricting the analysis to workers who joined the company before May 1995. We did not eliminate
observations from the PSID that involved interviews less than one year a part.  The results of  Lebow et al (1995)
suggest that we will overstate freezes at an annual interval by a small amount.5
surprising that a “bonus” is less subject to downward nominal rigidity.  Few hourly workers received
bonuses, so bonuses have little effect on the distribution of changes in compensation of this group.
Overall, our results suggest reductions in nominal wages are quite rare, especially for salaried
workers. Changes of 0 in compensation are fairly common, which, in combination with the small
number of wage cuts suggests nominal wage  ridigity is real. Bonuses serve to reduce nominal rigidity,
but nominal reductions that do not involve a change in part time status or  a change in performance
incentives are quite uncommon in this firm.  An interesting subject for future research is whether the use
of bonuses is positively related to the probability that a nominal wage floor would be binding.
III  An Econometric Model of Wages in the Presence of Downward Rigidity and Measurement
Error
Unfortunately, the wage policies of the firm we study may not be representative of the labor
market at large. To study the extent of nominal wage rigidity in the U.S. economy, w e work with the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and an empirical model of observed nominal wage changes that
incorporates measurement error and allows for nominal rigidity but also is consistent with flexible wage
changes. There are unfortunately few coherent economic models of downward nominal wage rigidity.
The principle difficulty is that most economic models have the property that agents care about real rather
than nominal variables. Thus, the rich literature on implicit contracts and the role of incentives in wage
setting has implications  for real wage dynamics but has little to say about nominal wages. One exception
in this literature is  MacLeod and  Malcomson (1993) , which provides a rationale for nominal wage
contracting. Our approach is to use an empirical model of nominal wage rigidity that has some intuitive
appeal. We then show that this model is consistent with the  MacLeod and  Malcomson formulation. In
section A, we present a model that nests perfect downward wage rigidity and perfectly flexible wages as
special cases. In Section B, we show that the  MacLeod and  Malcomson model also fits within our
framework. In Section C, we incorporate measurement error into the analysis and, in Section D, we
describe how we deal with problems posed by permanent heterogeneity in wages.
A.  The Model
The model assumes that there is an optimal wage that the firm would like to implement  in the
absence of downward nominal rigidity in period t,  but possibly taking account of the fact that the6
wage chosen today will constrain later wage choices. We will refer to this wage as the “notional wage”.
6
The constraints imposed by downward rigidity may imply that the firm does not implement the notional
wage if doing so would imply a negative nominal wage change. We write the log of the notional wage
(w it *) as a function of a vector of explanatory variables ( x it ), a parameter vector ( b) and a normally
distributed error term ( eit ).
it it it x w e b + = *
Let 
0
it w  be the log of the nominal wage at time t.  We structure the model so that if the notional
wage change implies a nominal wage increase, the actual wage change equals the notional wage change.
It is important to keep in mind that the value of  b is influenced by whether employers take into account
the possibility of being constrained by downward rigidity in the future when setting current wages.
7 The
value of  b in a labor market characterized by nominal wage rigidity is likely to differ from the value of  b
when wages are perfectly flexible.
If the notional wage change is a nominal wage cut of less than – a, then the model specifies that
the actual wage change is zero. The parameter  a is a positive constant to be estimated. The model allows
nominal wage cuts to occur when the notional wage change is sufficiently negative.  The model is
a e b e b l
e b a
e b e b
- £ - + + - + = -
£ - + £ - = -
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6 The notional wage can be thought of as  an efficiency wage that maximizes expected profit for the firm. Alternatively,
one can also think about it  as  the reservation wage of the worker in a model where this reservation wage is known to
the employer, the employer makes a take it or leave it wage offer to the worker, and the firm ignores the fact that
nominal wage rigidity may constrain future wage choices.
7 The development of such a formal model of firm behavior where there are costs to reducing nominal wages and where
the marginal revenue product of workers is stochastic is a natural extension of the approach we take.   Given the
prominent role of the assumption of nominal wage rigidity in the macro literature, it is surprising to us that there is no
rigorous treatment in the literature of how forward looking firms should set wages when it is costly to cut nominal
wages.7
The parameter  l is a positive constant that determines the response of wage changes to the notional
wage change when a cut is appropriate.   When  w w it it
*- = - -1
0 a,  w w it it
0
1
0 - = - - l a . The heavy line in
Figure 2 is the graph of the relationship between the actual wage change,  w w it it
0
1
0 - - , and the notional
wage change, w w it it
*- -1
0  that model (1) implies. The figure also identifies the range of values of  w w it it
*- -1
0
that correspond to flexible wages, freezes, and cuts. The wage model contains as special cases both a
model of perfect wage flexibility and a model of perfect downward nominal wage rigidity. In the case of
perfect flexibility, both  l and  a are zero. For perfect downward nominal wage  rigidity,  l is arbitrary and
a approaches  ¥. Because both these models are nested in the general model (1), one can test whether the
restrictions implied by either perfect rigidity or perfect flexibility are consistent with the data.
B.  The  MacLeod and  Malcomson model
In this section we show that our model nests  MacLeod and  Malcomson's (1993, hereafter MM )
model of wage contracts.  MM consider a fixed wage contract where w =  w
c .  Renegotiation of the wage
is only by mutual consent. The worker and the firm have outside options  w t ()  and  w t ()  respectively.
As long as  w t ()  is less than  w t () , it is optimal for the match to continue. If in any period t,  w
c  is less
than  w t ()  then the wage is adjusted upwards to  w t () . If in any period t,  w
c  is greater than  w t ()  then the
wage is adjusted down to  w t () . That is,  w t ()  and  w t ()  act as constraints on the wage.
So why would firms use this kind of contract? The answer is that it does a good job of protecting
both general investments and specific investments made by the firm and so the optimal investment level
is achieved. Consider the following sequence of events: The contract wage  w
c  is agreed. The firm makes
an investment I.  The firm and worker can renegotiate the contract wage at any period t by mutual
consent. The outside options vary across time, perhaps due to productivity shocks.
If the investment I is specific to the worker, then  w t ()  increases with I because greater I makes it
more valuable to the firm to maintain the current worker rather than replace the worker with someone
else. Thus, if sometime after the investment is made, the wage is adjusted downwards from  w
c  to
w t () because the firm’s outside option constraint binds, then the firm would not get the full payoff to the
investment. However, if the worker’s outside option binds, the firm still gets the full payoff to the
investment because  w t () does not depend on I.  To maintain the firm's incentive to make worker-specific8
investments optimally,  w
c  should be set low enough so that the firm’s outside option is never likely to
bind.
The fixed wage  w
c  can be set in nominal or real values. In the case of specific investments,
because it is fine for the worker’s outside option to bind but not for the firm’s to bind, the nominal wage
will be better than the real wage when there is positive inflation. Inflation will help ensure that the firm’s
outside option never binds when the wage is fixed in nominal units.
The MM model has the contract wage ( w
c  ) fixed in nominal terms and renegotiated up to
w t () whenever  w t ()  is greater than  w
c , and renegotiated down to  w t ()  whenever  w t ()  is less than  w
c
(everything in logs). With positive inflation the latter is unlikely to occur and so nominal wages will
generally be rigid downwards.
The MM model can be put in our framework as follows:
) ( ) (
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One can specify functional forms for  w t ()  and  w t ()  in terms of the x variables and regression
error and so end up with a nominal rigidity model that is quite similar in structure to the empirical model
above. Consider the following parameterization of the MM model:
w t () =  x it b +  eit
w t () =  a +  x it b +  eit  where  a>0
We can know rewrite (2) as
it it it it it it
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Comparing models (1) and (3), we see that model (3) is the special case of model (1) where  l is
constrained to equal  a. Thus, the intuitive model can be seen to encompass the MM model as a special
case.
C. Measurement Error
Because wages are rep orted with error, we parameterize the reported wage (w it ) as a function of
the true wage and the measurement error component  u it .
it it it u w w + =
0
Substituting this equality into model (1), we get the following model, which is expressed in terms of the
reported wage rather than the true wage.
a e b e b l
e b a
e b e b
- < + + - + + - + =
£ + + - £ - - =
‡ + + - + + - = -
- - -
- - -
- - - -
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0
0
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it it
u w x if u w x
u w x if u u
u w x if u w x w w
(4)
We use two alternative specifications for the distribution of  u it . The first is the standard
specification in which  u it  is  iid normal and independent of the other variables in the model. This implies
almost immediately that  u it - u it-1  is normally distributed.  This specification has two shortcomings.  First,
validation studies of wages and earnings show that a substantial fraction of workers report  their wages
exactly, which is a zero probability event if  u it  is normally distributed with positive variance.  Also, this
formulation is inconsistent with the fact that a substantial fraction of respondents report the same wage
in adjoining years.  Consequently, most of our results are based on a specification in which  u it  is equal to
0 with probability p and equal to a  N(0, su*
2) random variable  u* it  with probability (1-p).  We sometimes
refer to this specification as the mixed model of measurement error. Note that the mixed specification
assumes that the probability of reporting the true wage is independent across time periods. However, we
have experimented with specifications that allow for temporal correlation in the measurement error and
the obtained similar results to those we report.
D. Estimation Issues10
Unobserved heterogeneity poses a major problem for the estimation of this model. Because
unobserved ability is correlated with w it-1  ( cov(w it-1 ,  eit ) > 0), the distribution of  eit  depends w it-1 . Hence,
wit-1  cannot be treated as a predetermined variable in estimating the model. We deal with this problem in
two ways.
In Method 1, we replace w it-1  with its conditional expectation given lagged values of x.  The
basic idea is as follows. The model (1) implies 
0
1 - it w  is a function of 
0
2 - it w  and 
*
1 - it w . Since 
0
2 - it w  is
similarly a function of 
0
3 - it w and w it-3 *, 
0
1 - it w  is a complicated nonlinear function of the first wage on the
job and all the notional values of the wage since then. Because of the complexity of the algebra required
to calculate the expected value of 
0
1 - it w  in this way and the additional problems posed by measurement
error, we have instead approximated 
0
1 - it w  by modeling its expectation 
^
1 - it w   to be a linear function of x it-
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where  1 - - = it it it u u m  and  1 - - = it it it e m e . Model (5) is the model that we estimate. We assume that both
mit  and  e it  are normally distributed mean-zero random variables. Note that although one can always
decompose  wt-1
0  into its conditional expectation given lagged x variables and an error term, the error
term  mit-1  is not likely to be a homoskedastic, normally distributed random variable because  wt-1
0  is a
nonlinear function of  eit-1 ,  eit-2 , and so on. We assume it is normal for convenience. We estimate the
model by maximum likelihood.
8
In Method 2, we estimate the model under the assumption that w it-1  is approximately equal to w it-
1*. In this case we can use the equation w it-1 =X it-1 b +  eit-1  + u it-1  to eliminate w it-1  from the model.  One11
can justify this assumption when w it-1  is the first observation on the job, since the firm is not constrained
by a past wage when setting the wage for a new employee. However, if nominal wage rigidity
constrained the wage change between t-2 and t-1, w it-1  may exceed w it-1 *.  For this reason we prefer
Method 1 on a priori grounds.
Using either of these approaches to estimation, there are several caveats that must be
acknowledged. First, unobserved heterogeneity may bias the coefficients on the x variables. Fortunately,
the coefficient values are not the central focus of this paper.  All that matters for our purposes is that the
wage estimates capture the total effect of particular variables on wages controlling for the other
observed variables. Consequently, we define the coefficient vector  b and the error term  eit  so that  eit  is
orthogonal to  x it . Second, the sample is selected in that persons included worked for the same employer
in two consecutive years.  Below we use our model to study the impact of wage rigidity on quits and
layoffs.  Since quits and layoffs are likely to be affected by whether or not nominal wage floors are
binding, there is the potential for selection bias when we perform the analysis on  stayers.  Our empirical
results suggest tentatively that this may be an issue for quits and does not support strong conclusions
regarding layoffs.
9 Third, the model assumes that there is no upward nominal rigidity in that it assumes
that if the notional wage is greater than the previous wage, the notional wage is implemented.  We are
skeptical on a priori grounds that menu costs would cause firms to avoid adjusting wages at an annual
interval.  It is possible, however, that some firms do not bother adjusting wages when the notional
increase is very small, say less than a half percent.  Finally, we ignore possible effects of rounding of
actual wage or reported wages.
IV Implications of the Model
A.  The Effects of Wage Rigidity on Wage Levels and Changes
The model permits us to estimate several interesting variables that cannot be inferred directly
from the wage data because of the problem of measurement error. First, we can estimate the proportion
                                                                                                                                                                       
8 Another approach would be to  specifiy a functional form for the distribution of ( eit |w it-1 ,X it -1 ) and estimate the model
parameters along with the parameters of this conditional distribution by maximum likelihood. A problem is that the
model suggests that conditional distribution is unlikely to be normal.
9  In principle, one could estimate the model controlling for selection in who stays in the firm, but we have not
attempted to do so.12
of workers taking nominal wage cuts each year. Given estimates of the model parameters we calculate
the probability that  a e b - < + - - it it it w x 1  conditional on  x it   and 
^
1 - it w  when we use Method 1 to estimate
the model and conditional on  x it  and x it-1  when we use Method 2. We then take the average of the
probabilities over the sample members. Given estimates of  b and  a from the model, we calculate the
probability that a worker with a given x takes a nominal wage cut and, hence, the proportion of workers
that take wage cuts. Similarly, we use the model to estimate the proportion that have a nominal wage
freeze and the proportion that have a nominal wage increase in each year. The sum of the proportion
who take cuts and the proportion who have a wage freeze equals the proportion of workers whose wage
changes are constrained by downward nominal rigidities.
The model impli es that the actual wage will be at least as great as the notional wage. The
measured wage may be less than the notional wage in some cases because of measurement error, but on
average it will exceed the notional wage because measurement error has mean zero. We use the model
estimates to calculate  E(w
0
it  - w it *), the expected value of the difference between the actual value of the
wage and the notional value. The details of the calculation of  E(w
0
it  - w it *) are in Appendix 1.
Finally, we calculate what wage changes would be if there were no downward rigidities in the
current period. The model provides estimates of both the notional value of the wage at t and of the actual
value of the wage at t-1 and, by subtracting the latter from the former, we estimate the notional wage
change. By comparing this estimate to reported nominal wage changes, we estimate the effects of
downward rigidities on the average nominal wage change. Keep in mind, however, that the term
notional wage is the optimal wage in the absence of wage rigidity in the current period but with the
effect of current wage setting on future constraints accounted for. For example, wage offers to new
employees may lie below what they would be in the absence of nominal wage rigidity even if firms are
free to choose the starting wage subject to the constraint of competition for new workers.
10   In particular,
the gap between that actual wage and the notional wage is not the effect that nominal wage rigidity in
the economy has on wage levels. Consequently, these calculations should be taken with a grain of salt.
F. Real Effects of Nominal Rigidity on Layoffs, quits, and promotions
                                                
10  The simulation model that  Akerlof et al (1997) use to assess the effects of nominal simulation model ignores this
type of behavior, which would mediate the tendency of downward nominal wage rigidity to produce a real wage
distribution that is too high.13
One of the main reasons to be interested in nominal wage rigidity is that it may have effects on
real variables such as layoffs, quits, and promotions. Indeed, if nominal wage rigidity exists but has no
effect on employment dynamics, it is unlikely that it is of any substantive importance to the economy.
Solon,  Whately, and Stevens (1997) present a case where the  effects of wage stickiness within positions
is massively attenuated by the strategic use of promotions and demotions within firms.
11
 The approach we take is to use the estimates from the structural estimation to calculate a
predicted value of w it * for all workers employed at t-1 and then to examine how the probability of layoff
depends on w it * and w it . Since w it  is unobserved for workers who are not with the same employer at t
and at t-1, we use the wage adjustment model to estimate the expected value of w
0
it  - w it *   , as discussed
in Appendix 1. One would expect that the larger is the expected value of w
0
it  -  wit *, the higher the
probability that the employer will lay off the worker, and the lower the probability that the worker will
quit to a new job. We regress layoff, quit, and promotion indicators on a full set of explanatory variables
and on either  E(w
0
it  - w it * ) or the probability of a wage freeze for each worker.
V Data
We use data drawn from the 1971-1992 waves of the PSID. The sample is composed of workers
who are in the same job at t as at t-1, who are paid by the hour, who are not self employed, and who are
aged between 18 and 64. The PSID contains both a random sample and a poverty sample. We use only
the random sample in our analysis. We work with two subsamples. The first is restricted to white non-
union men. The second or "combined" subsample includes men and women of all races and both union
and nonunion workers. However it is drawn from the 1976-1992 waves because the information
available for wives is inadequate for our purposes before 1976.
There are two potential wage measures for hourly workers in the PSID: the reported hourly wage
rate and annual average hourly earnings. We have chosen to use the reported wage, as it is specific to the
current job and is also likely to be more accurately reported. Since the hourly wage is topcoded at $9.98
before 1978, many wage observations in those years are topcoded. In these cases average hourly
                                                
11  Devereux (2000) forthcoming shows that there is little evidence that position changes are used to adjust wages to the
business cycle in recent data from the PSID.14
earnings for the year have been used to predict the wage.
12  Wage growth in year t is computed as the
difference in the log of the wage in year t and in year t-1. We use the GNP deflator to construct our
measure of inflation. We compute the inflation rate as the difference in the log of this index from t-1 to t.
 We trim both of the subsamples of  stayers by excluding 1% of wage change observations in
each tail. The logic for trimming is to exclude wage changes that are most probably affected by
measurement error. The effect of the trim on the white male sample is to exclude wage changes of
stayers that involve cuts of greater than 23% and increases of greater than 51%. For the large sample, the
equivalent numbers are cuts greater than 26% and increases of greater than 45%. In table 1, we present
means of selected variables for both subsamples.
Figures 3 and 4 provide some further description of the nature of wage changes in the PSID data.
In figure 3, we draw a bar graph for the sample of non-union white men that is equivalent to figure 1’s
representation of wage changes in the personnel data. The striking difference between figure 3 and
figure 1 is that the number of nominal wage cuts is much higher in the PSID than in the personnel files.
The key question we attempt to address with our econometric model is whether these are real or reflect
measurement error in wage reports. Figure 4(a) shows how the proportion of cuts and freezes in the
white non-union men sample varies with the inflation rate. The pattern is clear; the proportion of cuts
and freezes are inversely related to the inflation rate. Figure 4(b) graphs the mean nominal wage change
against the inflation rate. Once again there is a clear relationship with nominal wage increases being
higher in periods of high inflation.
For the sample of non-union white men, the x variables include a constant, years of education,
tenure at t, tenure squared at t, labor market experience at t, labor market experience at t squared, the log
of the price level, the state unemployment rate at t, a time  trend , and separate indicators for whether the
worker was  married at t and lived in the south at t. In the combined sample we add controls for female,
white, female interacted with tenure and experience, and white interacted with tenure and experience.
When estimating 
^
1 - it w , we regress w it-1  on tenure at t-1, tenure squared at t-1, union member at
t-1, married at t-1, experience at t-1, experience squared at t-1, the price level at t-1, south at t-1, state
                                                
12  There are very few topcoded wages in our samples: In the small sample, there is one topcoded value in 1978. In the
combined sample, there is one case in 1977 and one case in 1978. We exclude salaried workers from the analysis
because some salary changes may be due to changes in work hours, and standard  hours levels are used to convert the
salary reports into an hourly rate.  The results of  Lebow et al (1995), Kahn (1997), and McLaughlin (1999) for the
PSID all suggest there may be less wage nominal rigidity for salaried workers but none of these studies deal with the
possibility of differential measurement error or hours variation. The results for our one firm, if anything, suggest the
opposite.15
unemployment rate at t-1, and year at t-1. The regressions also include the state unemployment rate at t-
2, the inflation rate at t-1, the inflation rate at t- 2, and interactions of these three variables with each
other and with all the other explanatory variables. 
^
1 - it w   is then the predicted value of w it-1  from this
regression. The full regression is reported in table A1.
VI Results for Wages and Wage Changes
We begin by showing that the amount of measurement error  required to square the hypothesis of
perfect downward wage rigidity to the data is consistent with the available evidence. We then show that
the log likelihood of the flexible wage model is much lower than the general model and the perfect
downward wage rigidity model. Finally, we discuss estimates of the key parameters of the wage rigidity
models.
A  Measurement Error and the Hypothesis of Perfect Downward Wage Rigidity
How much measurement error is required to reconcile the nominal wage cuts observed in the
data with the hypothesis that there really  are no nominal wage cuts? We address this question by
comparing the estimates of the variance of measurement error for the special case of the model where
there is perfect downward nominal wage rigidity to estimates based on matched employer/employee
reports of wages. For this perfect wage rigidity model using the combined sample the MLE estimates of
the probability p of reporting the true wage in each period is .5823 and the standard deviation of  ut
* is
.0697 (table II, column 4).
13  The implied estimate of the variance of the measurement error u t -u t-1  in the
wage change is .0041.
14  The variance of reported wage changes in this sample is .0081. Thus,
measurement error comprises (0.0041/0.0081)*100 = 51 percent of the variance of wage changes for the
combined sample of men and women who are paid by the hour and don’t change employers.
15  For the
sample of white male nonunion workers, the MLE estimate of p is .666 and the estimate of  su*  is .0675
                                                
13  Asymptotic standard errors do not account for serial correlation among the observations on a given individual or, in
the case of Method 1, for the fact that  $ wt-1 is an estimated  regressor.
14  This estimate is obtained using the formula  var( ) ( ) ( ) * * u u p p p t t u u - = ￿ ￿ - + ￿ - ￿ -1
2 2 2 2 1 2 1 s s .
15  While models with normally distributed measurement error and p=0 are inconsistent with the spike in wage change
distribution at 0, it is nevertheless interesting to compute measurement error variance implied by those models.  In
Appendix Table 2 for the combined sample we report that the standard deviation of  su is .0466. The implied estimate of
var(u t -u t-1 )=2(.0466)
2 =.0043, which is about 6 percent higher than the estimate of .0041 based on the mixed
measurement error model. The estimate of  var(u t -u t-1 ) is substantially higher in the untrimmed sample, as demonstrated
in Altonji and Devereux (1998).16
(table IV, column 3). The implied estimate of the variance of measurement error in wage changes is
0.0030.  This compares to the variance of nominal wage changes in this sample of .0083. Thus, the
variance of measurement error is about 36 percent of the variance of nominal wage changes.
To the best of our knowledge, the particula r wage measure that we use here, a reported hourly
wage rate for hourly  workers, has never been validated in a measurement error study.  However, in their
study of measurement error in earnings, Bound and Krueger (1991) estimated that the variance of
measurement error was 28% of the total earnings change variance. The findings of Bound, Brown,
Duncan, and Rodgers, 1994 (BBDR) are similar for log earnings. However for the change in the log  of
earnings divided by hours, BBDR found that measurement error composes 62% of the variance of total
wage changes for  stayers. Our measurement variances are in the middle of these estimates.
Unsurprisingly, when we restore the trimmed wage observations to the samples, the variance of
measurement error rises considerably. In the sample of white nonunion men, the estimate rises to .012
and contributes 67 percent of the wage change variance of .0178. This measurement error estimate is
just outside the range suggested by the validation studies.  The overall conclusion from the rigid model
is that, after trimming of extreme values, the variance of measurement error required for no actual
nominal wage cuts is well within the range of estimates provided by the validation studies that we are
aware of.
Card and  Hyslop (1997) report results from a January 1977 CPS validation study that collected
self-reported wage information from workers and matching information from their employers. They
report that among hourly workers paid above the minimum wage, 44% of employers and employees
report exactly the same wage. Given that the employer report may be  mismeasured but presumably are
at least as accurate as worker reports, this suggests that the proportion of workers who accurately report
their wage  is between 44% and 66.3%.
16  Our findings, using method 1, of a value of p equal to 0.666 is
at the upper end of this range. Our method 2 estimates are above the range.
B Likelihood Ratio Tests of the Flexible Wage Model
                                                                                                                                                                       
16  Let  p f   denote the probability that the firm responds correctly and assume that firms and workers make independent
errors. Then p ￿p f = .44. If p  £p f , (firms are at least as accurate as workers), then p=p f =.663 is the upper bound for p.17
Since both the perfectly rigid and the flexible models are nested in the general model, one can
use standard testing procedures to test the restrictions implied by the nested models. We conducted these
tests for the two samples using the normal measurement error specification in which the probability that
the worker reports the correct wage is 0. In this case, measurement error in wage changes is normally
distributed. We chose this measurement error specification because it is more favorable to the flexible
wage model.
17  The estimates for the combined sample using estimation method 1 are in table A2. The
log likelihood values for the general model, rigid wage model, and flexible wage models are 14580,
14520, and 12124 respectively, and a likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the flexible model in
favor of the general model.  The perfect wage rigidity model is also strongly rejected against the general
model at conventional significance levels, but the log likelihood value for the perfect rigidity model is
much higher than that for the flexible model, implying that perfect downward rigidity is a much better
approximation to reality than perfect flexibility.  We obtain similar results when we estimate the rigid
wage models using the sample of non-union white men. 2 (See Table A3).
A comparison of the estimates of the varian ce parameters from the flexible and rigid wage
models provides some insight as to how the rigid model accounts for the variance in measured wage
changes. In the flexible wage model, the variance of measurement error u t -u t-1  and the error  e t  in  w* t  -
w* t-1  are not separately identified but the total error variance is. The estimated variance of e for the
general model is .123
2= .0151, which actually exceeds the estimate of  .109
2=.0119 obtained for the total
variance  ( ) s s e u
2 2 2 +  based on the flexible wage model.   (See Table A2). The estimate of the total
variance ( s s e u
2 2 2 + ) in the flexible model is only about 60% of the total error variance in the other
models. The higher total variance of the error of the notional wage process in the rigid model arises
                                                
17   The flexible model cannot account for the fact that the wage change is exactly 0 for 12 percent of the observations
unless the distribution of the change in the stochastic component  et  is not normally distributed and depends on the
distribution of wage index (x t -x t-1 ) in a way that generates a mass point at 0.  When  et  is normal the likelihood function
for the flexible model is 0 for the 0 wage change observations, and so the log likelihood for the flexible wage model
sample is undefined. The models that allow for rigid wages are consistent with the mass point at 0 provided that some
fraction of the  respondents report the correct wage in both periods. Restricting both models to the case of classical,
normally distributed measurement error presumably levels the "playing field" between the flexible and rigid model. We
did not compare the rigid wage model to a symmetric menu costs model in which the true wage change is 0 if the
notional wage change is near 0, although such a comparison would be interesting. The fact that there are many small
positive wage changes in our firm sample and in the PSID raises doubts about a symmetric menu costs model.  On the
other hand, Smith's (1999) analysis of UK panel data suggests such a model  has empirical relevance. Note that the
values of the likelihood function for the two measurement error specifications are not comparable. The fact that the
likelihood value for the rigid model with normal measurement error in Table A2 exceeds that for the mixed
measurement error model is not a cause for concern or an indication that the true value of p is 0. Indeed, the likelihood18
because downward rigidity reduces the variance in actual wage changes by taking what would be wage
cuts and turning them into wage freezes.
C. Estimates of the wage rigidity parameters  a and  l
We now turn to the estimates of the alternati ve models of wage rigidity. We return to mixed
specification for measurement error. A key fact to keep in mind is that if wage cuts are rare, which
means that the wage cut threshold parameter,  a, is large, then the specific value of  a and the value of  l
are poorly identified, especially given that we have trimmed the data. Basically, a value of  a of .35 and a
value of 5000 both imply that wage cuts almost never happen. If wage cuts almost never happen, then
the parameter  l does not influence the distribution of wage changes.  The estimated standard errors for  a
and  l should be taken with a big grain of salt. We experienced numerical problems in the white
nonunion sample when we estimated the general model, which does not restrict either parameter. We
believe that this is a reflection of the fact that true nominal wage cuts are rare.
 Table II presents model estimates for the combined sample using Method 1, which involves
using the predicted value of w it-1  given lagged value of x to address the endogeneity of lagged wages in
the model. The log likelihood for the general model is 7015, which is slightly above the values of 7011
for  l=0 case and 7010 for the rigid model. A likelihood ratio test rejects the perfectly rigid model
against the general model at the .01 significance level.  The estimate of  a is .6536 (.1703) and the
estimate of  l is .0442 with a huge estimated standard error. This imprecision in the estimate of  l is
unsurprising because, as discussed above,  l is unidentified when  a is large. The estimates  a and  l are
.319 (.0171) for the MM specification, which restricts  a to equal  l.  The log likelihood value for the
MM specification is somewhat below that for the other specifications. The use of the mixed
measurement error specification improves the relative performance of the perfectly rigid model, as
comparison of the results in Tables II and A 2 demonstrates. The estimated probability of a nominal
wage cut is essentially 0 for all four specifications and, as we shall see, the estimates imply that a large
proportion of workers experience nominal wage freezes.
Table II also reports estimates of  b, the coefficients on the x variables that appear in the equation
(1) for  wit *. These estimates are not sensitive to the specification of wage rigidity.  They are very similar
to what we obtain when we estimate the flexible wage model (not shown). For example, the coefficient
                                                                                                                                                                       
value for the rigid wage model with the mixed error  structure  is only  -5669 when we estimate the model with p19
on education is .06, the coefficient on union is .2486, and the coefficient on female is - .2612. The value
of 1.226 for the coefficient on the log price level is typical of what we obtain. The fact that the price
level exceeds 1.00 is probably related to the fact that we obtain an unusually large negative coefficient
of - .023 on the time trend, since the price level has a strong positive trend.  One should keep in mind
when interpreting the coefficients on the price level, the time trend, and the state unemployment rate that
we have made no attempt to account for dynamics or for the fact that the current aggregate price level
may not be predetermined in a nominal wage regression. Thus, one should not give these coefficients a
structural interpretation.
Table III reports estimates based on Method 2, which uses the assumption that w
0
it-1  = w it-1 * and
so eliminates w it-1  from the model.  With Method 2, the general model and the MM model yield very
similar results. Both specifications imply estimates of  a and  l of about .06.  The smaller value of  a
obtained using Method 2 goes hand in hand with a larger estimate (.035) of the probability of a cut and a
smaller estimate (.149) of the probability of a freeze.  There is an inverse relationship between the
values of p and  a that permit the model to fit the number of observations with 0 wage changes. The
smaller value of  a means that the probability the wage falls in the range in which there is a freeze is
reduced, and so a larger value of p is "required" for the model to match the percentage of observations
with 0 reported wage changes.  The likelihood values of the general model and the perfectly rigid model
are 9201 and 9113 respectively, so there is strong evidence against perfect rigidity.
 In contrast to the Method 1 results in Table II, the coefficients on x variables in Table III refer to
effects on the notional wage change rather than the notional wage level. They are not directly
comparable to the wage level coefficients in Table II. These estimates are not sensitive to the wage
rigidity specification or to whether we use the mixed or normal measurement error specification. The
small point estimates bring attention to an unfortunate fact of life in surveys such as the PSID---it is very
difficult to predict nominal wage changes with the available  regressors.  The R
2 of an OLS regression of
the nominal wage change on the x variables used in Table III is only .068, and the smallest value of the
predicted nominal wage change in the combined sample is .016. (The sample mean is .070). These facts
imply that we are relying heavily on the assumption that  eit  is normally distributed for identification.
Table IV and V report  corresponding estimates for the white nonunion male sample for 1971-
1992. Basically, the estimates are broadly similar to those obtained for the combined sample and we
                                                                                                                                                                       
constrained to .01, while the unconstrained maximum is 7010.20
omit a detailed discussion to save space.
18  This fact suggests that union contracts are not the main source
of nominal wage rigidity.  Only a handful of observations on w it-1  are at or below the federal minimum
wage in this nonunion white male sample or in the combined sample, and only 3 of these involves a 0
wage change. Consequently, minimum wages do not appear to be an important factor in nominal wage
rigidity either.
D Implications of the Model Estimates for Wage Growth, Wage Freezes, and Wage Cuts
In this section we further explore the implications of the model estimates for wage growth. We
will use the estimates from the general model for this exercise but since the estimates are similar across
models it does not matter much which model we choose. In the case of the combined sample with
estimation method 1, we were unable to estimate the general model. For this case, we use the estimates
from the MM model.  In columns 2 and 3 of table VI, we present means by year of the inflation rate and
the reported nominal wage change w it  – w it-1  for the combined sample. The rest of the columns report the
mean of the notional wage change, which is the estimate from the model of  1 * - - it it w w , the probability
of a wage cut, the probability of a freeze, and the mean of  E(w
0
it  - w it * ), which is the conditional
expectation of w
0
it  - w it *  given current and lagged x values.  (See Appendix 1).   The results in Table VI
refer to the combined sample and are for the general model, which has the highest likelihood value.
Columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 are based on the Method 1 parameter estimates while columns 8-11 refer to
Method 2.
19
In table VI, we see that the estimated probability of a nominal wage cut is essentially 0 in each of
the years when we use Method 1. The estimates are below the value of 2.5% that we obtained for hourly
workers using the firm personnel file. (As we noted earlier, almost all of the nominal cuts for that firm
are associated with a change between combined and part time status or to a lessor extent a change in
whether compensation is incentive based.)  The very low estimates of the pay cut probability obtained
from the model contrast sharply with the 11.1 % and 13.6% of reported nominal wage changes that
                                                
18  For this sample we were not able to estimate the general model using Method 1. The large value of  a means that
there are no cuts to identify  l separately from  a. See Table V, column 2. In the first column we note that we
experienced difficulties in computing standard errors for  the  model with  a free and  l constrained to 0.
19  Results for the other versions of the rigid wage model are very similar when we use Method 1. In the case of Method
2, the probability of a cut is lower (essentially 0) than the results for the general model in the table when we restrict  l to
equal 0. Table VI reports results for the combined sample. The patterns are similar to those for the combined sample
and so we focus on the results for the combined sample.21
involve  a pay cut in the combined and nonunion white male samples (respectively). The model implies
that essentially all of the reported nominal wage cuts are due to measurement errors rather than actual
nominal cuts. The estimates also imply a high probability of a nominal wage freeze. For the combined
sample across all years, 43% of wage changes are estimated to involve a nominal wage freeze. This
estimate is very high in comparison to the percentage of freezes in reported wages of 11.7% in the
combined sample and 13.6% in the sample of nonunion white men.  Given measurement error one
would expect the estimated probability of freeze to exceed the fraction observed in the raw data, but the
estimates are also much higher than the value of 12.71 percent that we obtained for hourly workers from
the particular firm.  Using Method 2 the implied percentage of freezes is 14.9 percent, which is still
quite substantial. We do not fully understand why Method 1 and II yield such different estimates of the
percentage of wage freezes. As a matter of arithmetic, the difference is closely related to the fact that
with Method 2 we get much higher estimates of p and lower estimates of  a.
There is a lot of variation across years in the proportion of nominal wage cuts and/or nominal
wage freezes. Pay cuts and freezes are more likely to occur when inflation is low such as during the mid-
eighties and early nineties.  When we regress the yearly  estimates  based on Method 2 of the probability
of a freeze or a cut on the inflation rate and the change in the state unemployment rate we obtain
Prob (Cut) = 0.0585 - 0.0067 * Inflation rate + 0.0022 * Change in State Unemployment Rate
       (0.0076) (0.0013) (0.0023)
Prob (Freeze) = 0.3331 - 0.0338 *  Inflation rate + 0.0080 * Change in State Unemployment Rate .
(0.0258)  (0.0080)        (0.0074)
For Method 1, we only report the regression for  Prob (Freeze) because the odds of a cut are essentially 0
in all years. The regression estimate is
Prob (Freeze) = 0.5733 – 0.0399 * Inflation rate - 0.0021* Change in State Unemployment Rate
 (0.0501) (0.0089)         (0.0153)
What is the effect of nominal wage rigidity on the wage growth rates of  stayers? The Method 1
estimates in column 3 and 4 of table VI imply that the actual nominal wage change for  stayers  exceeds
notional wage growth  wt *- w t-1  by 0.0469 on average.  This average difference seems large us and may
not be precisely estimated, but it should be kept in mind that the difference in growth does not
accumulate over time.  In keeping with the model, the size of the gap is a negative function of the22
inflation rate, which reflects the fact that freezes are less common when inflation is high. The estimates
based on Method 2 in columns 8 and 9 follow the same pattern, but the difference between the actual
wage growth and notional wage growth is smaller and less sensitive in absolute terms to inflation. This
reflects the fact that the probability of a freeze is much smaller when we use this estimation strategy and
cuts are more common.  Because of the variation in the estimates, we do not draw strong conclusions
about the size of the effect of downward rigidities on average wage changes of  stayers.
VII Real Effects of Nominal Rigidity on Layoffs, Quits, Promotions, and Relative wages
A. Effects of Nominal Rigidity on Layoffs, Quits, and Promotions:
In this section we test whether layoffs, quits, and promotions that occur between t-1 and t are
affected by the amount the worker is going to be overpaid at t because of downward nominal rigidity.
One might expect that the more overpaid a worker will be at t, the more likely his employer will lay him
off between t-1 and t. The worker should also be less likely to quit if he is overpaid on the current job.
The effect of downward rigidity on promotions is less clear cut but it has been suggested that employers
use position changes to adjust wages when wages within positions are rigid. In this case, the degree of
rigidity would affect the probability of promotion.
In Table VIII we estimate separate linear probability models for the probability of a layoff, a
quit, and a promotion. The right hand side variables are  E(w
0
it  - w it * ) and a set of control variables
consisting of education, tenure at t-1, tenure squared at t-1, experience at t, experience squared at t,
married, south at t-1, change in state unemployment rate at t, and a full set of year dummies. We
suppress the coefficients on the control variables. Equations estimated using the combined sample have
additional controls for female, white, and union member.  In some specifications, we replace  E(w
0
it  -
wit * ) with the estimated probability of a nominal wage freeze for the worker. The  E(w
0
it  - w it * ) variable
and the probability of freeze variable are calculated using estimates from the general model of wage
rigidity. Each cell of the table represents a separate regression.  We report the coefficient (standard
error )  on the variable of interest for the specified dependent variable, sample, and estimation method.
The results of the estimation differ considerably depending on whether Method 1 or Method 1I is
used in the estimation of the wage model. The Method 1 results suggest only a small effect of nominal
rigidity on quits. The coefficient on  E(w
0
it  - w it * ) is -.087 (.098) in the combined sample (Panel A) and -23
.162 (.192) in the nonunion white men sample (Panel C), but neither is statistically significant.
Prob (freeze) enters negatively and is statistically significant at the .01 level in the combined sample. The
coefficients in the layoff equation are mixed in sign, very small in magnitude and never statistically
significant.
20  The signs of the coefficients on the rigidity measures are mixed in the promotion
regressions but are positive and significant at the .10 level in the case of nonunion white men (Panel C).
When Method 2 is used, the coefficients in the quit regressions are always negative and are
statistically significant when  Prob (freeze) is used as the measure of wage rigidity. They are also very
large. For example, for the combined sample, the 10
th  percentile of  E(w
0
it  - w it *) is 0.0013 and the 90
th
percentile is 0.0101. Thus, the coefficient of  - 3.6  in the specification with the time trend suggests that if
a worker changed from being at the 10
th  percentile to being at the 90
th  percentile, the probability of
quitting would fall by about 0.03 (3.6  ￿ .009). Given that the mean quit probability is about 0.10, this
amounts to a substantial effect of nominal rigidities on quit probabilities. The estimates for layoffs from
Method 1 are smaller in magnitude and mixed in sign.  The promotion estimates are generally
insignificant but the signs suggest that workers who are overpaid are less likely to be promoted.
Given the fact that the magnitude of the estimates differ greatly between Method 1 and Method
2, we have not learned that much about the magnitude of the effect of nominal rigidities on quits and the
other transitions. However, given the agreement in the signs across the quit specifications, and statistical
significance in many cases, there is modest support for the hypothesis that when workers are relatively
overpaid because of nominal rigidities, they are less likely to quit. This is in keeping with our
expectations and implies that downward nominal rigidity does have real effects on labor market
outcomes.
B. Effects of Inflation on the Wage Structure:
Partition  x t  into (x 1t ,  pt  ) where  pt  is the inflation rate and x 1t  consists of the other wage growth
determinants. The notional wage change equation in (1) can be rewritten as
w w x x t t t t t t t t
* * ( ) - = - + + - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 b p b e e  .
The model of nominal wage rigidity implies that holding the inflation rate constant, the wage growth of
workers with larger values of  x t b are less likely to be constrained by nominal wage floors. This means
that nominal wage floors tend to compress differences in within job wage growth. Furthermore, the
                                                
20  Standard errors are probably understated because we have not taken account of the fact that the variable of interest is
a predicted value or for heteroskedasticity in the linear probability models.24
higher the inflation rate, the lower the probability that the wage floor binds for any given value of  x t b
and the smaller the degree of compression.  This reasoning implies that the interaction  between   pt  and
the index z t b 1 will enter negatively in a within job wage equation of the form
  w w z b b z b b t t t t t t t - = + + ￿ ￿ + -1 1 2 1 3 p p n ( )
where z t  contains current and lagged values of labor market variables and person and job match specific
variables that predict wage growth within a firm and  nt  is a composite error term.  In the table below we
report nonlinear least squares estimates of b 3 for three samples.  The first is the sample of hourly
nonunion white males used elsewhere in the paper. The second is combined sample consisting of
observations on hourly males and females for 1976-1992. The third consists of hourly or salaried males
and females for whom we have reported wage data from 1971-1992, which permits us to maximize
sample size as well variation in the inflation rate. (We do not have data on salaried workers prior to 1975
and lack data on married females prior to 1976.)  We measure inflation as the change in the log of the
price index.
The Effect of Inflation on the Response of Actual Wage Growth to Predicted Wage Growth (b 3)
Sample Estimate (standard error) of b3
Nonunion White Males, Hourly,  1971-1992 2.35
(4.72)
Males and Females, hourly 1976-1992. -3.98
(1.48)
Male and Female Household heads, hourly 1971-1974, hourly
and salaried 1975-1992,
Married Females, hourly and salaried 1976-1992.
4.0
(4.8)
The point estimate of 4.0 for in the third row for the largest sample implies that an increase in the log
price change by .10 would increase a .05 difference in the log wage change when inflation is 0 to about
.07, a large effect. However, the estimates of b 3 vary in sign across the samples and are imprecisely
estimated.  Consequently, we are not able to draw conclusions about whether nominal wage rigidity
interacts with inflation to effect relative wage growth.25
VI Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we explore the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity in the U.S.
economy. We do so using two very different types of wage data. The first type, personnel data, is
probably free of measurement error data but is not nationally representative. The second type is wage
data from the PSID, which is nationally representative but contains measurement error.
We approach the PSID data by estimating a model of wage determination that nests downward
nominal rigidity as well as flexible wages and directly incorporates a model of measurement error in
wage reports. In keeping with the evidence from replications studies, we find that measurement error in
wages is better described by a mixed distribution in which respondents sometimes report wages
accurately than by the more standard assumption of normally distributed measurement error. However,
we should point out that we do not take account of rounding in the data or possibility that measurement
error is correlated with the actual wage.
The PSID data overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis of perfect flexibility.    There is also some
evidence against the hypothesis of perfect downward nominal wage rigidity in favor of a more general
model that incorporates downward rigidity but acknowledges that some nominal wage cuts may occur,
although many specifications of the general model imply that the probability of a nominal wage cut is
essentially zero. We find that true wage changes have many fewer nominal cuts than reported wage
changes have, with our point estimates ranging from essentially 0 for our preferred estimation
methodology to .035. We also find more nominal freezes than reported nominal wage changes.
Unfortunately, the estimates range widely, from .15 to .43, depending on the estimation methodology
and sample.
Our analysis of the wage and salary data from personnel files of a large financial corporation also
suggests that reductions in nominal wages are quite rare, especially for salaried workers. Changes of
zero in compensation are fairly common in the firm and wage cuts are infrequent. These findings
suggest that downward nominal wage rigidity is present. Bonuses serve to reduce nominal rigidity, but
nominal reductions in base salary or hourly pay that do not involve a change in part time status or a
change in performance incentives almost never occur in this firm. An interesting subject for future
research is whether the use of bonuses is positively related to the probability that a nominal wage floor is
binding, such a period of low inflation.  Our finding that nominal wage cuts are rare is consistent with
the findings of Baker,  Gibbs, and  Holmstrom (1994),  who also use personnel data.  Further work with
this kind of data for a broad set of firms is needed to provide more precise information about the26
frequency of cuts and freezes, the role of rounding and symmetric menu costs, and the circumstances in
which cuts and freezes occur than is possible with noisy data from household surveys.
The cumulative evidence from previous research and the present paper constitutes a strong case
that nominal wage rigidity is pervasive in the U.S. labor market. Much less is known about whether
nominal wage rigidity matters. We obtain modest support for the hypothesis that workers who are
overpaid because of nominal wage rigidities are less likely to quit.  However, our analysis of the effects
of nominal wage rigidity on layoffs, promotions, and relative wage growth rates is inconclusive.
Research on whether nominal wage rigidity has real effects on employment, mobility patterns, and
relative wages deserves a high research priority.
Finally, a more structural approach to the study of wage rigidity is needed.  In an environment in
which it is costly to cut nominal wages, firms should take account of the possibility of future constraints
when setting current wages. A structural model of wage setting behavior in presence of nominal wage
rigidity might be a useful tool with which to study wage and employment dynamics and the effects of
inflation on the labor market.27
Appendix 1: Calculating  E(w
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Consider model (5) once more.
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Using the fact that the expected value of  u it  is zero and the assumption of a zero covariance between  u it
and  e it , one arrives at the following expression, expression (6)
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The terms in the expression can be further defined as follows:
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Ignoring selection issues, for any group of workers who are employed at t-1, expression (6) can
be used to predict what the difference between the notional wage and the actual wage at t will be if they
stay with the same employer. In order to evaluate the expression we need to know the value of the x
variables at t for all workers, including those who do not stay with the same employer. The value of the
inflation rate and the state unemployment at t do not pose a problem because they are known for all
workers and do not depend on whether or not the worker changes jobs.  For tenure and experience, we
take the value of tenure and experience at t-1 and add 1 in order to have the values of these variables
assuming the workers stay with the same employer. We assume that union status would not change
between t-1 and t if the worker were to stay in the same job until t.   In this way we get a set of x values
at t for all hourly workers who are employed at t-1. We then use equation (6) to estimate the value of
E(w
0
it  - w it *) for each worker under the assumption that they stay with the employer they have at t-1.29
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Log of nominal hourly wage 2.0123 0.4422 0.4055 4.1744
change in the log of hourly wage 0.0746 0.0910 -0.2231 0.5108
Years of Education 11.7939 2.1826 2.5 17
Tenure 8.0290 6.9073 1 42.2440
Experience 18.4964 10.8935 3 47.3333
Married 0.8832 0.3213 0 1
South 0.3579 0.4794 0 1
Year 83.7652 5.6910 72 92
Log of price level 4.4334 0.3107 3.7087 4.8251
Change in Log of Price Level 0.0527 0.0191 0.0296 0.0983
Change in State Unemployment rate 0.0698 1.3782 -5.9333 6.4333
State Unemployment rate 6.6898 2.0211 2.2667 15.2
Indicator for nominal wage cut 0.0883 0.2838 0 1
Indicator for nominal wage freeze 0.13601 0.3428 0 1




Log of nominal hourly wage 2.0388 0.45515 0 4.576668
change in the log of hourly wage 0.0703 0.089932 -0.2551 0.448025
Years of Education 11.8948 2.078078 2 17
Tenure 8.9540 7.610207 1.083333 45.6916
Experience 18.1277 10.16682 2 47.5
Married 0.8222 0.382323 0 1
Female 0.4177 0.493194 0 1
White 0.8861 0.317688 0 1
Union member 0.3543 0.478308 0 1
South 0.2966 0.456791 0 1
Year 84.9183 4.695698 76 92
Log of price level 4.5063 0.235794 3.975936 4.825109
Change in Log of Price Level 0.051381 0.018662 0.029569 0.098345
Change in State Unemployment rate 0.022489 1.394761 -5.93333 6.933333
State Unemployment rate 6.998659 2.116549 2.266667 15.2
Indicator for nominal wage cut 0.111461 0.314713 0 1
Indicator for nominal wage freeze 0.117435 0.321948 0 132
Table  II : Estimates from Wage Models using Combined Sample (Method 1)

























































































































































































Prob (freeze) 0.4303 0.4314 0.4188 0.4296
Prob (cut) 0.00001 0.00003 0.0087 0
log(L) 7015 7011 6914 701034
Table III: Estimates from Wage Models using Combined Sample (Method 2)



























































































































































Prob (freeze) 0.1493 0.1689 0.1491 0.1689
Prob (cut) 0.0358 0 0.0353 0
log(L) 9201 9113 9193 911336
Table IV: Estimates from Wage Models using White Non-union Male Sample (Method 1)



































































Prob (freeze) 0.3817 0.3792 0.3804
Prob (cut) 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
log(L) 2007 2003 2005
* Could not compute standard errors because of singularities37
Table V: Estimates from Wage Models using White Non-union Male Sample (Method 2)


































































































































Prob (freeze) 0.1601 0.1746 0.1602 0.1748
Prob (cut) 0.0254 0.0000 0.0242 0.0000
log(L) 2585 2561 2582 256138
Table VI: Predicted Cuts, Predicted Freezes, Reported Wage Changes, and Actual Wage Changes by
Year for Combined Sample















































76 5.3963 0.0925 0.0779 0 0.2705 0.0236 0.0818 0.0145 0.0925 0.0029
77 6.1838 0.0977 0.0806 0 0.2714 0.0235 0.0853 0.0123 0.0834 0.0026
78 6.8169 0.0875 0.0365 0 0.3857 0.0366 0.0867 0.0115 0.08 0.0024
79 8.0676 0.0985 0.055 0 0.3323 0.0306 0.0936 0.0084 0.0652 0.0019
80 9.8345 0.1067 0.0866 0 0.2416 0.0189 0.1083 0.0042 0.041 0.0011
81 8.3216 0.099 0.0809 0 0.2688 0.0233 0.0954 0.0077 0.0617 0.0018
82 5.3066 0.087 0.0498 0 0.3538 0.0354 0.0777 0.0169 0.1024 0.0033
83 4.1207 0.0644 0.0222 0 0.4287 0.0396 0.0662 0.0277 0.1379 0.0049
84 3.6244 0.0618 0.002 0 0.4918 0.0502 0.0541 0.0458 0.1829 0.0072
85 3.7122 0.0626 0.006 0 0.4809 0.0501 0.0569 0.0407 0.1719 0.0066
86 2.9569 0.0448 -0.0244 0 0.5715 0.066 0.0505 0.0526 0.1975 0.008
87 3.9781 0.053 0.0012 0 0.496 0.055 0.0529 0.0477 0.1874 0.0074
88 4.2101 0.056 -0.0032 0 0.5072 0.0563 0.0519 0.0497 0.1917 0.0076
89 4.8653 0.0606 0.0165 0 0.4472 0.0443 0.054 0.0455 0.1829 0.0071
90 5.0745 0.0588 0.0115 0 0.4645 0.0463 0.0539 0.0458 0.1835 0.0072
91 4.3319 0.0611 0.0018 0 0.4942 0.05 0.0505 0.0527 0.1973 0.008
92 3.512 0.0514 -0.0191 0 0.5615 0.0609 0.0425 0.0722 0.2317 0.0101
Overall 5.1381 0.0703 0.0234 0 0.4303 0.0437 0.0657 0.0358 0.1493 0.0057
Notes: The results in columns 4-7 are means by year of estimates of the general model using Method 1
(Table 2). The results in columns 8-11 are based on estimates of the general model using Method 2
(Table 3). See Section VI D.39
Table VII: Predicted Cuts, Predicted Freezes, Reported Wage Changes, and Actual Wage Changes by
Year for the Non-union White Male Sample















































72 3.238 0.0877 0.0675 0 0.2948 0.0241 0.0717 0.0165 0.1374 0.0048
73 4.552 0.0709 0.0891 0.0001 0.2525 0.0223 0.08 0.0114 0.1105 0.0037
74 8.955 0.1117 0.1331 0 0.1541 0.0109 0.1095 0.0028 0.0463 0.0013
75 7.823 0.1174 0.126 0 0.1669 0.0114 0.0997 0.0045 0.0625 0.0018
76 5.3963 0.0961 0.0659 0 0.2906 0.0214 0.0857 0.0091 0.0952 0.0031
77 6.1838 0.0983 0.0654 0.0001 0.3041 0.0261 0.0892 0.0077 0.0859 0.0027
78 6.8169 0.106 0.044 0.0001 0.3585 0.0314 0.0934 0.0063 0.076 0.0023
79 8.0676 0.109 0.0626 0 0.3003 0.0231 0.1001 0.0046 0.0624 0.0018
80 9.8345 0.1202 0.0826 0 0.2403 0.0169 0.1098 0.0028 0.0455 0.0013
81 8.3216 0.0957 0.0833 0 0.2515 0.0181 0.0958 0.0054 0.0699 0.0021
82 5.3066 0.0856 0.037 0 0.3895 0.0332 0.0739 0.0145 0.1279 0.0044
83 4.1207 0.0561 0.046 0 0.3653 0.0308 0.0634 0.0229 0.1662 0.0062
84 3.6244 0.063 0.0175 0.0001 0.4545 0.044 0.0577 0.0293 0.1899 0.0074
85 3.7122 0.0689 0.024 0.0003 0.429 0.0434 0.0558 0.0319 0.1984 0.0079
86 2.9569 0.0445 -0.0027 0.0004 0.503 0.0504 0.0493 0.0415 0.2279 0.0095
87 3.9781 0.0556 0.0139 0.0003 0.4492 0.0433 0.0525 0.0364 0.213 0.0087
88 4.2101 0.0582 0.019 0.0002 0.4341 0.0396 0.0526 0.0362 0.2125 0.0086
89 4.8653 0.0613 0.0308 0.0002 0.3928 0.0346 0.0546 0.0334 0.2035 0.0081
90 5.0745 0.0601 0.0313 0.0002 0.3911 0.0336 0.0542 0.0341 0.2054 0.0083
91 4.3319 0.0554 0.0114 0.0002 0.4576 0.0412 0.0483 0.0442 0.2335 0.0099
92 3.512 0.0439 -0.0211 0.0007 0.5669 0.0585 0.0411 0.0593 0.2693 0.0123
Overall 5.2707 0.0746 0.0397 0.0002 0.3792 0.0341 0.0688 0.0254 0.1601 0.0063
Notes: The results in columns 4-7 are means by year of estimates of the MM model using Method 1
(Table 4). The results in columns 8-11 are based on estimates of the general model using Method 2
(Table 5). See Section VI D.40
Table VIII: The Effects of the Probability of a Wage Freeze and  E w w t t ( )
* 0-  on Quits, Layoffs, and


















































































Notes: The coefficients (standard errors) in the table are linear probability coefficients from separate
regressions of the dependent variable in the column on  E(w
0
it  - w it *) or  Prob(freeze) and a set of
controls.  E(w
0
it  - w it *) is the expectation of the gap between the actual wage and the notional wage given
the model parameters and the characteristics of worker  i in period t. The creation of this variable is
described in appendix 1.  Prob (freeze) is the conditional probability of a wage freeze. All equations
control for year dummies and for education, tenure, tenure squared, experience, experience squared,
change in marital status, change in state unemployment rate, and residence in the south.  Equations
estimated using the combined sample have additional controls for female, white, and union member.
The sample size is 19841 for combined sample and 6134 for the nonunion white men sample. The
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level on the basis of a two-
tailed test.41
Appendix Tables
Table A1: REGRESSIONS USED TO CREATE  $ wt-1
         SMALL SAMPLE       COMBINED SAMPLE
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error Estimate Error
INTERCEPT -3.71411 0.414638 -3.81148 0.764871
Education 0.053684 0.010309 0.110686 0.006122
Tenure at t-1 0.005948 0.009048 0.034051 0.005118
Tenure at t-1 squared 0.000785 0.000336 -0.00057 0.000164
Union member at t-1 0.313941 0.029309
married at t-1 0.03643 0.064861 -0.02211 0.030753
Years of experience at t-1 0.015013 0.008689 0.030913 0.005328
Years of experience at t-1
squared
-0.00043 0.000191 -0.00053 0.000118
Log of price level at t-1 1.584433 0.196958 1.502994 0.282144
South at t-1 0.117196 0.04993 0.172135 0.029028
State Unemployment rate at t-1 0.057668 0.020008 0.035224 0.010861
State Unemployment rate at t-2 0.112079 0.058388 0.036295 0.045164
Inflation rate at t-1 12.78718 8.917637 12.27066 12.15867
Inflation rate at t-2 -4.99105 7.871795 -1.48044 7.746704
Female -0.09782 0.027641
White 0.261568 0.041613
Inflation rate at t-1 * Education -0.15233 0.1701 -0.24002 0.109356
Inflation rate at t-1 * tenure at t-1 0.230539 0.162102 -0.04785 0.091465
Inflation rate at t-1 * tenure at t-1
squared
-0.01083 0.00596 -0.00025 0.003057
Inflation rate at t-1 * union
member at t-1
-0.38581 0.513628
Inflation rate at t-1 * married at t-
1
0.485202 1.168798 0.113039 0.572249
Inflation rate at t-1 * years of
experience at t-1
-0.36863 0.141367 -0.24835 0.090887
Inflation rate at t-1 * years of
experience at t-1 squared
0.007386 0.003088 0.005683 0.002077
Inflation rate at t-1 * log of price
level at t-1
-1.21082 1.922158 -0.74169 2.462397
Inflation rate at t-1 * south at t-1 -1.41131 0.77933 -1.53012 0.497981
Inflation rate at t-1 * state
unemployment rate at t-1
-0.68811 0.364525 -0.42076 0.209464
Inflation rate at t-1 * state
unemployment rate at t-2
0.526387 0.388167 0.297496 0.244019
Inflation rate at t-1 * inflation rate
at t-1
-33.1245 27.45393 -16.9217 20.09195
Inflation rate at t-1 * inflation rate
at t-2
46.3455 40.87874 20.24589 39.00604
Inflation rate at t-2 * Education 0.011547 0.160364 -0.34724 0.10116742
Table A1 continued
Inflation rate at t-2 * tenure at t-1 -0.04568 0.151336 -0.14397 0.084354
Inflation rate at t-2 * tenure at t-1
squared
-0.00135 0.005491 0.002708 0.002818
Inflation rate at t-2 * union
member at t-1
-0.80352 0.476699
Inflation rate at t-2 * married at t-
1
0.802646 1.087046 0.131119 0.527249
Inflation rate at t-2 * years of
experience at t-1
0.231664 0.13249 0.073915 0.084007
Inflation rate at t-2 * years of
experience at t-1 squared
-0.00461 0.002918 -0.0026 0.001921
Inflation rate at t-2 * log of price
level at t-1
0.742176 1.618211 1.189473 1.528412
Inflation rate at t-2 * south at t-1 0.312444 0.727527 -0.26624 0.456651
Inflation rate at t-2 * state
unemployment rate at t-1
0.015985 0.307743 0.181332 0.199188
Inflation rate at t-2 * state
unemployment rate at t-2
-0.34621 0.332731 0.042817 0.224306
Inflation rate at t-2 * inflation rate
at t-2
-14.3927 23.42115 -14.276 24.03076
Inflation rate at t-1 * white -0.87038 0.68078
Inflation rate at t-1 * female -0.91415 0.488754
Inflation rate at t-2 * white -0.78849 0.626616
Inflation rate at t-2 * female -1.18442 0.46007
female * tenure at t-1 0.004427 0.000941
female * years of experience at t-
1
-0.00436 0.000676
white * tenure at t-1 0.00404 0.001307
white * years of experience at t-1 -0.00476 0.000977
0.002083 0.003785
-0.00624 0.002529
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
Education
0.000823 0.001027 -1.3E-05 1.49E-05
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
tenure at t-1
0.002375 0.000863 0.002884 0.002784
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
tenure at t-1 squared
-0.00011 3.09E-05 0.003891 0.002987
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
union member at t-1
0.000157 0.000497
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
married at t-1
-0.00011 0.006345 4.28E-06 1.14E-05
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
years of experience at t-1
0.002228 0.000848 -0.0065 0.008506
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
years of experience at t-1
squared
-3.3E-05 1.91E-05 -0.01578 0.002826
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
log of price level at t-1
-0.03246 0.010644 -0.00286 0.000887
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
south at t-1
-0.01951 0.004987 0.001593 0.00076343
Table A1 continued
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
state unemployment rate at t-1
-0.00257 0.001664 -0.00267 0.000592
State unemployment rate at t-2 *
state unemployment rate at t-2
0.000508 0.001418 -0.00031 0.000459
Year -0.03019 0.009079 -0.03562 0.007839
Number of Observations 6134 1984144
Table A2: Estimates from Model where Measurement error is normally distributed
Combined sample. ( standard errors in parenthesis).














2 + 2 su
2 0.0119
(0.0001)
Prob (freeze) 0.4456 0.0000 0.4789
Prob (cut) 0.0158 0.2888 0.0000
log(L) 14580 12124 14520
Note: See Table II for a list of the variables in the models.
Table A3: Estimates from Model where Measurement error is normally distributed
Non-union white males sample. ( standard errors in parentheses)














2 + 2 su
2 0.0103
(0.0001)
Prob (freeze) 0.3658 0.0000 0.4330
Prob (cut) 0.0247 0.2635 0.0000
log(L) 4490 3902 4473
Note: See Table IV for a list of the other variables in the models.45
Figure 1a
Frequency
Diff. in 96 and 97 log salaries





Figure 1a: Frequency of the change in log annual salary ,  Salary Workers.
Figure 1b
Frequency






Figure 1b: Frequency of the change in the log hourly wage, Hourly Workers.46
Figure 2: The relationship between the Actual wage change and
the Notional wage change
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Year
Wage Change
Inflation Rate49